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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
NICHOLAS LAMARR# : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 900574 
vs. : 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT : 
OF TRANSPORTATION and 
SALT LAKE CITY, i Category 16 
Defendants/Appellees. : 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
JURISDICTION 
Defendant Utah State Department of Transportation hereby 
agrees with and incorporates by reference the statement of 
Jurisdiction found in the Brief of Nicholas Lamarr, Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Defendant Utah State Department of Transportation, 
pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
hereby submits that the following issues are before this Court that 
were not presented in the Appellant's Brief. 
1. Did the failure of the Plaintiff, Nicholas Lamarr, to 
comply with the requirements of §63-30-12 Utah Code Ann. 1953, by 
not having filed a timely notice of claim with the Office of the 
Attorney General require the dismissal of this action as to the 
Utah State Department of Transportation? 
2. Did the Utah State Department of Transportation owe 
a duty to Nicholas Lamarr under the facts of the instant case? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
§63-30-10(1) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived 
for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of employment except if the 
injury arises out of: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the 
discretion is abus€»d; 
§63-30-12 Utah Code Ann. 1953 
A claim against the state, or against its employees for 
an act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, is 
barred unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney general 
and the agency concerned within one year after the claim arises, or 
before the expiration of any extension of time granted under 
Section 6 3-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving 
rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant Utah State Department of Transportation 
incorporates by reference the arguments concerning duty, proximate 
cause, and transients not being a defective condition of the 
roadway found in the Appellee Brief of Salt Lake City. 
1. Plaintiff served his notice of claim only upon the 
Department of Transportation. §63-30-12 Utah Code Ann. 1953, 
clearly requires that a notice of claim be served on both the 
2 
agency and the Attorney General's Office- Because the plaintiff 
failed to fulfill the condition precedent for filing an action 
against a state agency, this action should be dismissed as against 
the department for lack of jurisdiction. Because the plaintiff's 
failing is a jurisdictional one, it could not be waived and could 
have been raised at any time by either party or by the court sua 
sponte. 
2. Any conduct of the Department concerning signing on 
the North Temple Overpass was not a proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff was not misled, but was fully 
aware of the existence of the pedestrian walkway. That the 
plaintiff would be intimidated by unknown third persons from using 
tne pedestrian walkway; that he would chose to use the vehicle 
travel portion of the overpass rather than detour to the next 
available pedestrian walkway; that an acquaintance of the plaintiff 
would make an unsafe lane change in an effort to give the plaintiff 
a ride and that this would cause another car to be forced into 
striking the plaintiff cannot be said to have been reasonably 
forseeable to the Utah State Department of Transportation. 
3. To show negligence on the part of the Utah State 
Department of Transportation, it is first necessary to show that 
the Department had a duty of reasonable care extending to the 
plaintiff. No such duty exists given the circumstances of the 
instant action. The Department had no duty to control third 
persons who might congregate on or near the pedestrian walkway in 
question. The Department also urges this Court to rule that it had 
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no duty towards a pedestrian who, with knowledge of the walkway, 
affirmatively choosers to instead use the vehicular lanes of travel. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant Utah State Department of Transportation 
incorporates herein by reference the arguments found in the 
Appellee's Brief of Salt Lake City as far as the same are 
applicable to this Defendant, and adds the following argument. 
I. PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF 
CLAIM WITH THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
WAS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT REQUIRING THAT THE 
INSTANT ACTION BE DISMISSED AS IT PERTAINS TO 
THE UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
While this issue was raised but not decided in the trial 
court, this Court M... may affirm trial court decisions on any 
proper ground(s), despite the trial court's having assigned another 
reason for its ruling (footnote omitted)". Buehner Block Co. v. 
UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
The claims of Plaintiff against the Utah State Department 
of Transportation are subject to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
which provides at Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12: 
A claim against the state, or against 
its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the Attorney General and the agency 
concerned within one year after the 
claim arises. . . . (Emphasis added.) 
The statutory language above is clear and unambiguous. 
Where, as here, suit is brought against an agency of the State of 
Utah, a condition precedent to bringing suit is the* filing of a 
timely notice of claim with the State agency and the Office of the 
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Attorney General. If this is not done, suit is barred. 
In Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), this 
Court addressed the question of what the effect was of not filing 
the appropriate Notice of Claim. This Court held that the 
dismissal of an action for failure to file a timely notice of claim 
was a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 
Because the plaintiffs in Madsen I did 
not give the required notice and therefore 
failed to satisfy a precondition to suit, the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider 
the merits of their claim. 
Id., 769 P. 2d at 250. Such a jurisdictional issue cannot 
be waived. In Olson v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 724 P.2d 960, 
964 (Utah 1986) held that "... a lack of jurisdiction can be raised 
at any time by either party or by the court." 
In Sears v. Southworth v. State, 563 P.2d 192 (1977), 
the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed for failure to comply with 
the notice of claim requirement of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
In Sears, the plaintiff argued that although no formal notice of 
claim was filed as required by Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-12, the State 
did receive adequate notice of the accident and was aware, or 
should have been aware, of the negligence involved. The Sears 
court cited Varoz v. Sevev, 506 P.2d 435 (1973), with approval. 
Actual knowledge of the circumstances 
. . . does not dispense with the necessity of 
filing a timely claim. 
Plaintiff may not be excepted from the requirement 
that he file the appropriate notice of claim. In Scarborough v. 
Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975), this Court 
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addressed the companion statute that mandates the filing of a 
timely notice of claim when suing a political subdivision of the 
State of Utah. §63-30-13 Utah Code Ann. is virtually identical to 
S63-30-12. 
In dismissing an action against a School District where 
the notice of claim was not filed in a timely manner, this Court 
explained: 
The School District is a political 
subdivision of the state. Therefore it would 
normally be immune from suit; and the right to 
sue is an exception created by statute. We 
have consistently held that where a cause of 
action is based upon a statute, full 
compliance with its requirements is a 
condition precedent to the right to maintain 
a suit. 
Id. at 4B2. The same logic applies even more 
emphatically to an action against the State of Utah itself. 
Moreover, even were Plaintiff to argue that this Defendant received 
adequate notice of the accident and was aware, or should have been 
aware of its alleged negligence, there would still be no legal 
excuse for failure to file a notice of claim because "actual 
knowledge of the circumstances . . . does not dispense with the 
necessity of filing a timely claim." Varoz v. Sevey, 506 P.2d 435 
(Utah 1973). 
A notice? of claim was filed with the Utah State 
Department of Transportation, but no such notice of claim was filed 
with the Attorney General. A notice of claim in this action should 
have been filed with the Attorney General as well no later than 
April 18, 1988. The only document upon which Plaintiff could 
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attempt to rely, in claiming to have complied with this statute, 
was the single filing with the Department of Transportation. In 
the instant case, full compliance with § 63-30-12 requires filing 
a notice of claim with the Attorney General and with the Utah 
State Department of Transportation. 
United States District Court Judge J. Thomas Greene 
addressed this issue in Kabwasa v. University of Utah, 89-C-488G, 
United States District Court for the District of Utah. Kabwasa 
involved, among other issues, state law claims against the 
University of Utah. In dismissing those claims, Judge Greene held 
that the filing of a notice of claim with the Attorney General's 
Office, but not with the 'agency concerned', did not comply with 
§63-30-12 and was grounds for dismissing the claims. (See Exhibit 
D.) In so ruling, Judge Greene explained: 
ruling, Judge Greene explained: 
The court agrees with the defendants 
that the plain meaning of section 63-30-12 
requires that two notices of claim should have 
been filed by plaintiff: one to the Attorney 
General and one to the University of Utah. 
Although this statutory requirement may result 
in redundant notice being given, such 
redundancy apparently is mandated by the 
statute inasmuch as the Utah Attorney General 
is the agent and legal counsel for all state 
agencies, including the University of Utah. 
In this pendant state law claim, the court is 
unwilling to ignore the unambiguous language 
of the Utah statute requiring two separate 
notices, especially where the Utah Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that strict 
compliance with the notice of claim provision 
is essential to maintain a suit pursuant to 
the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Memorandum Decision and Order at page 5. Plaintiff, 
having failed to comply with §63-30-12, his claims are now barred 
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and his complaint against Defendant Utah State Department of 
Transportation herein should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
II. NO ACTION OF THE UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE 
PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES 
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P. 2d 240, 245 
(Utah 1985, this Court set out the definition of proximate cause. 
The standard definition of proximate 
cause is "that cause which, in natural and 
continuous sequence, (unbroken by an efficient 
intervening cause), produces the injury and 
without which the result would not have 
occurred. It is the efficient cause - the one 
that necessarily sets in operation the factors 
tnat accomplish the injury." (footnote 
omitted) 
In Butterfield v. Okubo, 790 P.2d 94, 97-98 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals explained that: 
The element of proximate causation in a 
tort case inquires into whether the defendant 
could, under the circumstances, reasonably 
foresee that the harm of which the plaintiff 
complains would result from the defendant's 
breach of the standard of care. (Citations 
omitted.) Without proof of proximate cause, 
the plaintiff cannot recover in tort, 
(Citations omitted.) 
To determine if the Utah State Department of 
Transportation was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's alleged 
injuries, it is mjcessary to look at the sequence of events that 
led to the accident in question. 
1. Th€> Utah State Department of Transportation, in 
designing the North Temple Overpass, created a pedestrian walkway 
separate from the vehicular travel portions of the structure. No 
signs were placed expressly forbidding pedestrians from using the 
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vehicle lanes and requiring that pedestrians use the pedestrian 
walkway that is provided. 
2. Nicholas Lamarr, knowing of the existence of the 
pedestrian walkway, uses the pedestrian walkway to cross from east 
to west on the North Temple Overpass. 
3. Lamarr is frightened by contact with unknown 
individuals at the western end of the pedestrian walkway. 
4. Lamarr decides to avoid the persons he believes are 
still at the western end of the pedestrian walkway by returning 
eastward by another route. 
5. Lamarr, rather than use the walkway or walk several 
blocks to the next pedestrian path, decides return to the eastern 
end of the North Temple Overpass by walking against traffic in the 
northernmost westbound vehicular lane of traffic. (There are three 
westbound lanes of traffic). 
6. Don Ainsworth, an acquaintance of Mr. Lamarr's, was 
driving in the center westbound lane of the North Temple Overpass 
looking for Nicholas Lamarr. Upon seeing Lamarr, Ainsworth swerved 
his vehicle into the northernmost lane of travel to pick up 
Nicholas Lamarr. 
7. The Ainsworth vehicle struck a car being driven by 
Stanley Cross. Cross' car was thereby forced into Lamarr, causing 
the complained of injuries. 
The Utah State Department of Transportation urges this 
Court to hold that its conduct in designing the North Temple 
Overpass is not a proximate cause of the accident in question. 
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It is hard to believe that, in designing the Overpass, 
any individual could have foreseen the strange course of events 
that unfortunately led to the instant accident. That an unhappy 
encounter with some people on the walkway would lead an individual 
to use the vehicle lanes of the overpass where he would be struck 
by a car forced into him by a friend who was making an unsafe lane 
change could not be reasonably foreseen. 
It is also a question of inappropriate speculation, at 
best, to hypothesize on whether or not the presence of some 
specially created no pedestrian sign would have altered the 
decision of plaintiff. 
For these reasons, and those set forth in the Brief of 
Salt Lake City, which has been adopted herein by reference, the 
Utah State Department of Transportation urges this Court to affirm 
the trial court's finding that this defendant was not a proximate 
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 
III. UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF LAMARR GIVEN THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE INSTANT ACTION 
In order to show that the Utah State Department of 
Transportation was negligent in this action, the plaintiff must 
show: 
(1) a duty of reasonable care owed by the 
defendant to plaintiff; (2) a breach of that 
duty; (3) the causation, both actually and 
proximately, of injury; and (4) the suffering 
of damages by the plaintiff. 
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985). The 
Department expressly adopts and incorporates by reference the 
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argument of Salt Lake City in its brief on the subject of duty. 
Plaintiff has misunderstood the issue of the duty of 
reasonable care that a plaintiff must show he was owed by a 
defendant to prove negligence. All of plaintiff's argument 
claiming that the Governmental Immunity Act has expressly waived 
immunity for this action is misplaced. 
Plaintiff has confused the question of sovereign immunity 
with the basic tort principle that negligence can only be shown by 
establishing a duty running from the defendant to the plaintiff 
that the defendant has breached. 
This is not an action seeking to show a duty owed by the 
Department to the public using the pedestrian walkway to design, 
construct and maintain the walkway so that it is safe for the 
expected use of the public. Nor is this action concerning a duty 
by the Department to design, construct and maintain the vehicle 
travel portion of the North Temple Overpass so that it is afe for 
the expected use of the motoring public. 
Instead the plaintiff appears to ask this Court to create 
one of two new duties. First, the plaintiff seeks to have this 
Court declare that the Department has a duty to control the actions 
of unknown third persons who may intimidate members of the public 
who are using state roads and walkways. Plaintiff does not show 
that the Department has any special relationship with these unknown 
third persons or with plaintiff. Given this Court's decision in 
Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989), no such duty 
exists. 
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Second, plaintiff asks this Court to hold that the 
Department had a duty to prevent a pedestrian, who is aware of the 
pedestrian walkway, from using the vehicle travel portions of the 
Overpass. The Utah State Department of Transportation urges this 
Court to find no special duty owed by the Department to an 
individual who intcmtionally misuses a state road. To do otherwise 
would be to make the State an insurer of the public. 
The duty, if any, of the State of Utah to Nicholas Lamarr 
was to design, construct and maintain the pedestrian walkway free 
of dangerous or defective conditions. The presence of unknown 
third persons near the western terminus of the walkway is not a 
dangerous or defective condition for which the State owes any duty 
to plaintiff. State of Utah hereby incorporates by reference the 
argument of Salt Lake City that 'transients' are not a "defective 
condition" of the roadway. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Nicholas Lamarr never filed a notice of claim 
with the Attorney General's Office as required by statute, the 
courts never had jurisdiction over the merits of his claims against 
the Utah State Department of Transportation. 
Even if such a notice of claim had been properly filed, 
plaintiff has failed to show that any conduct of the Department was 
a proximate cause of his injuries. 
Finally, the Department owed no duty of reasonable care 
to the plaintiff in the unique situation that Lamarr placed himself 
into. 
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For these reasons, the Utah State Department of 
Transportation respectfully asks this Court to affirm the dismissal 
with prejudice of this action as it relates to the Department. 
Respectfully submitted this /*? day of May, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Utah Attorney General 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant Utah 
State Dept. of Transportation 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Defendant/Respondent Utah State 
Department of Transportation, postage prepaid, to the following 
counsel of record on this the /*7 ^ day of May, 1991: 
Gordon K. Jensen 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES 
The Harmon Building 
3540 South 4000 West, Suite 100 
West Valley, Utah 84120 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Roger F. Cutler 
City Attorney 
Bruce R. Baird 
Assistant City Attorney 
451 South State Street, Suite 505 
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Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
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 f 
vs. 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, TOM BURT, 
GREG COVER, MARK FLUTSY, DAVID 
HOLBROOK, STEFHEN B. MOULDING, 
STACIE RADLEY, GAYLE O. SNYDER, 
LYLE STEVENS, JERRY THOMPSON, 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Civil No. 89-C-4BBG 
This xnatter came on regularly on March 15, 1990 for 
hearing on Defendants' Motions for Partial Dismissal and for 
Partial Surjnary Judgment. Defendants were represented by 
Assistant Utah Attorney General William Evans and Assistant Utah 
Attorney General Reed M. Stringham, and plaintiff was represented 
by L. 2ane Gill. After briefing by the parties and oral 
argument, the court took defendants' motions under advisement. 
Now, being fully advised, the court sets forth its Memorandum 
Decision and Order. 
BACKGROUND 
This case involves claims of racial discrimination in 
connection with plaintiff's employment at the University of Utah, 
which was terminated on December 4, 1987. Plaintiff's suit names 
the University and various University employees as defendants. 
In addition to alleging various common law pendant tort claims 
(Counts IV through X), plaintiff alleges violation of Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) £fc. seq., 
(Count I), and violation of his civil rights redressable under 42 
U.S.C. S§ 1981, 1983 (Counts II and III). 
All defendants moved for summary judgment on the 
pendant state lav claims (Counts IV through X), on the basis that 
plaintiff failed to file the requisite notice of claim pursuant 
to sections 63-30-11 and -12 of the Utah Code. In addition, 
defendant University of Utah moved to dismiss all claims, except 
the Title VII claim (Count I), on the basis that such claims are 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that the State of Utah has 
not waived immunity as to the University under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. SS 63-30-1 to -38 
(1969). Plaintiff conceded in his second reply brief that all 
claims against the University except Count I should be dismissed. 
Accordingly, those claims are dismissed. Also, defendant David 
Holbrook moved for dismissal of all counts against him, and 
plaintiff conceded in his second reply brief that defendant 
Holbrook should be dismissed entirely from plaintiff's suit. 
Accordingly, all claims against defendant Holbrook are dismissed. 
Defendant Stacie Radley moved for summary judgment as to Count 
VII, the breach of fiduciary duty claim, but that ©otion was 
withdrawn at the time of argument. 
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The only issue that remains Is whether plaintiff's 
pendant state law clams against thr i<&aining individual 
defendants ought to be dismissed for failure by plaintiff to 
comply vith the notice of claim provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, l»fn1 rodr * HI || C 3-30-1], -12. 
DISCUSSION 
For purposes of their motion on the notice of claim 
issue, the individual defendants agree that plaint ill's causes of 
action arose on December 4 19B7, the day plaintiff's employment 
was terminated. On September 15, 1988, plaintiff's attorney L. 
Zane Gill delivered a letter addressed to William Evans, an 
Assistant Attorney General of the State of Utah, This letter 
outlined the acts of discrimination allegedly suffered by 
plaintiff and discussed settlement if the matter. At issue is 
whether this letter satisfied the "notice of claim*1 requirement 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
1. Fecpjirenent of Two Notices 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act governs the 
procedure for suing the State of Utah and its agencies and 
erployees. Sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-12 of the Act sets forth 
the notice of claim requirement at issue in this case. Section 
63-3 0-12 provides: 
A claim against the state, or against 
its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim 
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Is filed with the attorney general and the 
agency concerned within one year after the 
claim arises . . . regardless of whether or 
not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1989). 
Defendants argue that plaintiff's letter of September 
15, 1988 to en Assistant Attorney General is insufficient because 
the statute explicitly requires the that two notices be sent; one 
to the attorney general and one to the "agency concerned,91 which 
in this case is the University of Utah. As support, defendants 
cite several Utah Supreme Court cases which emphasize that full 
compliance with the notice of claim requirement is necessary to 
maintain an action pursuant to the statute, even if a defendant 
has actual notice of the claim. Payne v. Kvers, 743 P.2d 186, 
190 (Utah 1987); Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 
480, 482 (Utah 1975); Varoz v. Sevev, 506 P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 
1973) . 
Plaintiff responds to defendants1 argument by claiming 
that the requirement of filing two notices is redundant and 
unnecessary. Plaintiff asserts that notice was filed with 
Assistant Attorney General William Evans whom plaintiff's counsel 
Knew to be counsel for the University. Plaintiff argues that Kr. 
Evans was a duel agent for both the Attorney General and the 
University of Utah, and that the single notice filed with Kr. 
Evans was tantamount to filing separate notices with the Attorney 
General and the University. 
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The court agrees vith the defendants that the plain 
meaning of section 63-30-12 requires that two notices of claim 
should have been filed b> plaintiff: one to the Attorney General 
and one to the University of Utah. Although thii statutory 
requirement »ay result in redundant notice being given, such 
redundancy apparently is cii'dated by the statute inasmuch as the 
Utah Attorney General is the agent and legal counsel for all 
st at i agencies, including the University of Utah. In this 
pendant state lav claim, the court is unwilling to ignore 
unambiguous language of the Utah statute requiring two separate 
notices, especially where the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that strict compliance with the notice of claim provision is 
essential to maintain a suit pursuant to the Governmental 
Immunity Act. 
2. Notice Pequirement for Individual Capacity 
Defendants 
Plaintiff alternatively argues that even if his notice 
of claim is deemed insufficient, his claims against the 
individual employees for acts committed in their personal 
capacity—as opposed to acts committed jr their official or 
representative capacity—should not be dismissed. In this 
regard, jJaintiff argues that because section 63-30-4(4) only 
addresses suits against employees in the,.] ri vy iresentative 
capacity,* the Act does not apply to or preclude suits against 
employees in the Si ^personal capacity." Section 63-30-4(4) of 
5 
the Governmental Immunity Act provides: 
An employee may be joined in an action 
against a governmental entity in a 
representative capacity if the act or 
omission complained of is one for which the 
governmental entity may be liable, but no 
employee may be held personally liable toy 
acts or omissions occurring durinq the 
performance of the employee^ duties, within 
the scope of employment or under color of 
authority, unless it is established that the 
employee acted or failed to act due to fraud 
pr malice, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(4)(1989)(emphasis added). 
Also relevant to this inquiry is section 63-30-4(3) o 
the Act, which provides: 
The remedy against a governmental entity 
or its employee for an injury caused by an 
act or omission which occurs during the 
performance of such employee^ duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority is, after the effective date of 
this act, exclusive of any other civil action 
or proceeding by reason of the same subject 
matter against the ^ employee. . . whose act or 
omission gave rise to the claim, unless the 
employee acted or failed to act through fraud 
or malice. 
Id. at S 63-30-4(3)(emphasis added). 
Defendants1 argue that the notice of claim provisions 
of the Governmental Immunity Act, Sections 63-30-11 and -12, do 
not distinguish between personal and representative capacity 
actions, and therefore a notice of claim is required in al1 sui 
against state employees. The notice of claim provision provide 
that a written notice of claim must be filed by any person who 
has •'a claim. . . against an employee for an act or omission 
6 
occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scpp? 
fif employment, or under color of authority.* Xfl. at f| 63-30-
11(2)# 63-30-12 (emphasis added). 
The U1 th Su| re^p Count keeE!> !u a j e i with defendants' 
position as reflecting the meaning of section 63-30-11 since the 
1963 Amendment thereof in Hadsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 
(Utah 1988), flu court caul that th« effect of the 1 Su 1 amendment 
cc the statute was to leave only the first paragraph of 63-30-11, 
". • . which requires that a notice of claim be filed with the 
State in all suits brought against fctate employees for actions 
taken in the course of their employment." (Emphasis added.) 
Manifestly, the actions of defendants were taken in the course of 
their employment. The Governmental Immunity Act contemplates 
that ar employee can be held personally liable for acts in the 
course of employment (i.e., "acts or omissions occurring during 
the performance of the employee1* duties, within the scope of 
employment or under the color of authority11) if it is established 
that the employee "acted or failed to act due tt ! i aurt cr 
malice." Utah Code Ann. 63-30-4(3) It follows that the notice 
of claim provision likely would be interpreted by the Utah 
Supreme Court as now constituted to 1>* applicable to M l claims 
against 6tate employees, "whether or not any judgment might 
ultimately be payable by the State," as long as the employees' 
alleged acts "were taken U the course of their employment.11 
Ha_dsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d at 252 I any event, that is this 
7 
court1* "Erie guess." 
Based upon the foregoing, defendants" Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment is granted, and plaintiff1* pendant 
state law claims (Counts IV through X) against all defendants are 
dismissed. As noted earlier, defendant David Holbrook is 
dismissed entirely from plaintiff1* suit, and all claims against 
defendant University of Utah are dismissed except for Count I, 
the Title VII claim. 
Counsel for defendants is directed to prepare a fora of 
Judgment consistent with this Memorandum Decision and Order and 
lodge the same with the court after compliance with Local Rule 
13(e). 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: June 5 , 1990 
J THOMAS GREENE 
fUTED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
COPIES TO: 
8 
mp 
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
June 13# 1990 
MAILING CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
Re: 2:89-CV-00488 
rrue and correct copies < f th* attached were mailed by the clerk to the 
following: 
Villiain T. Evans, Esq. 
Utah State Attorney General's Office 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
L. Zane Gill, Esq. 
50 West Broadway, Ste. 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
